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Abstract
Motivation and method
Existing rational expectations models cannot satisfactorily explain why political budget
manipulations systematically raise re-election chances and only occur in “specific contexts”.
This paper offers a theoretical explanation by including unsophisticated voters into an oppor-
tunistic political cycle model; unsophisticated voters are unable to take the optimal behav-
iour of other agents (fully) into account, but may, nonetheless, vaguely suspect government
deception.
Results
First, rationally expected manipulations are, on average, fruitless in equilibrium. By including
unsophisticated voters we can, however, corroborate empirically found electoral effects of
political budget manipulations. Second, unsophisticated voters become anxious and suspi-
cious in an intransparent or uncertain world, but the government tries to “outperform” their
scepticism by increasing budget manipulations in order to appear more competent and, ulti-
mately, increase re-election chances. It is, therefore, not surprising that political budget
cycles are observed in countries suffering from intransparencies such as developing coun-
tries or new democracies. Third and in addition, the model presented here predicts that polit-
ical opportunism produces, unintentionally, a countercyclical policy effect in election years,
thereby, for instance, alleviating the typical problem of policy procyclicality in developing
countries.
Additional contribution
The paper also offers a theoretical explanation for political distortions found in forecasts by
US states. Based on overly optimistic revenue forecasts the incumbent state government
can conduct expansionary fiscal policies in order to appear more competent prior to an
upcoming election. Since the resulting deficit can only be observed afterwards, the govern-
ment can effectively circumvent a constitutional balanced budget constraint. As a result,
there are political forecast and budget cycles in the state. More generally, however, these
findings may also apply to European countries where balanced budget constraints are or
will be in place (for instance the debt brakes in Switzerland and Germany); similarly, they
apply to the supra-national European Fiscal Compact of the European Union.
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Introduction
It has become conventional wisdom that small deviations from rationality can make significant
differences to economic equilibria as suggested by Akerlof and Yellen [1]. If a share of the pop-
ulation fails to respond optimally to changes in the environment, outcomes may be signifi-
cantly different to those under full rationality by all agents. Akerlof and Yellen [1] define
behaviour as near-rational, if a shock leads to first-order welfare effects for society, but only
second-order losses for individuals who may then exhibit “inertial behavior”, i.e. not respond
fully rationally to the shock. They derive the rationale for near-rationality from the Envelope
Theorem and present various examples from macroeconomics and industrial organisation.
Near-rationality in monetary policy is discussed, for instance, by Woodford [2] and Adam and
Woodford [3]. The (“distorting”) effect of non-maximising behaviour on the equilibrium has
been studied in numerous papers; some of the earlier ones are Haltiwanger and Waldman [4],
Russell and Thaler [5] [6], Berry [7] and Fudenberg and Maskin [8]. Going beyond near-ratio-
nality in his Nobel speech, Akerlof [9] presents a plethora of behavioural reasons for explaining
“six [empirically observed] macroeconomic phenomena” that New Classical economics and its
rational expectations paradigm ([10, 11]) cannot account for. Those behavioural reasons are,
for instance, asymmetric information, rationing due to efficiency wages, the use of rules of
thumb involving money illusion, downward wage rigidity as implied by prospect theory, a lack
in self-control as embodied in hyperbolic discounting, or the role of identity in explaining self-
destructive behaviour.
Another behavioural reason for deviations from rational expectations outcomes is encoun-
tered in the voting literature. Unlike sophisticated voters [12], unsophisticated voters do not
take the rational behaviour of the rest of society into account. Unsophisticated voters take deci-
sions on the basis of a distorted perception of reality or do not link their perception to their
voting decision, whereas sophisticated voters are empirically found to (typically) form correct
expectations and vote rationally according to Alt, Lassen and Marshall [13]. Aidt (p. 359) [14],
concludes that “voters may not be fully informed but they know enough to make rational and
informed decisions”, whereas Aidt and Dutta (p. 354) [15] contend that “other groups (the
poor and uneducated) . . . are . . . unlikely to cast rational . . . votes”. In Bohn [16], voters can
be mislead by the government because it can use its incumbency advantage to manipulate vot-
ers’ perceptions of the deficit. In Maloney and Pickering [17], sophisticated voters can distin-
guish (long-term) trend growth from short-term economic cycles, whereas unsophisticated
voters only respond to raw GDP data.
This paper introduces unsophisticated voters into the political cycle literature because they
can explain empirical phenomena that cannot be explained satisfactorily by existing rational
expectations models. First, there is empirical evidence that political budget manipulations sys-
tematically raise re-election chances. But rational expectations models cannot produce this
result by construction; if manipulations are rationally anticipated, then they will, at least on
average, be fruitless in equilibrium. Second, there is no (rational expectations) explanation
why political budget cycles should be “context-conditional”. However, empirical evidence
shows that political budget manipulations only occur in “specific contexts”, for instance in
countries with fiscal or government intransparencies, in developing countries, or in new
democracies (see next section). The institutional settings that are conducive to political budget
cycles have one element in common though; they give rise to perceived uncertainties about the
functioning of institutions. Unsophisticated voters are unable to take the optimal behaviour of
others (fully) into account, but become more anxious when the world around them turns
more intransparent or uncertain. As a result, they are likely to become more suspicious about
being deceived by the government. The government, in turn, will increase its political budget
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manipulation in order to appear more competent and, ultimately, be able to increase its re-
election chances.
In addition to providing the theoretical rationale for the aforementioned empirical phe-
nomena, this paper also finds a new theoretical result which has yet to be verified empirically.
The model presented here predicts that political opportunism produces, unintentionally, a
countercyclical policy effect. It is clear that a government will adjust its fiscal manipulation, if
its (honest) expectation of economic growth changes. But this paper suggests that the fiscal
manipulation does not change 1-for-1 with the expected change in economic growth. Take a
recession. If the government cut spending too much, it could lose the support of unsophisti-
cated voters (who may be unaware of a looming recession and/or unable to fully disentangle a
recession from government policies). The government is, therefore, willing to accept a higher
deficit, although it is costly. This is a countercyclical effect compared to the fiscal manipulation
when there is no recession. In case of a boom, the situation reverses. The government has addi-
tional resources that can be used for appearing more competent. Given that re-election
chances are increased when spending goes up, it is optimal for the government to reduce its
expected (costly) deficit somewhat relative to the deficit it would have desired without boom
expectations. Again, this is a countercyclical effect. Note that this is not countercyclical
Keynesian policy, but an additional effect motivated by opportunistic government behaviour
in election years. It is a positive analysis of (additional) conditions conducive to countercyclical
policies. As for fiscal consolidations, it augments the discussion of conditions and problems of
such consolidations as presented, for instance, by Perotti [18].
This result goes beyond the mere existence of political budget cycles (for the standard case
of no recession expectations) as confirmed by ample empirical evidence. It says that expected
recessions increase such a political budget cycle. This is a new theoretical finding, which can,
in principle, be tested empirically. More generally, it is claimed that opportunistic government
behaviour has a stabilising effect in both booms and recessions that occur during an election
year. It is particularly good news for many developing countries that used to suffer and mostly
still suffer from procyclical fiscal policies (for instance [19]); at least during a recession occur-
ring in an election year, the economic contraction would be somewhat alleviated. The mecha-
nism is similar to the one in Aidt and Dutta [15] [20]. There, “economic [regulation] policy is
more inefficient during booms than during recessions” ([15], p. 354). Policy is, therefore,
employed countercyclically. Here, it is the fiscal policy that is more costly and more inefficient
in booms rather than recessions (in terms of affecting the government’s re-election chances).
As a result, opportunistic government behaviour produces a countercyclical policy effect,
though not with that intention in mind.
This paper also explains forecast manipulations observed in US states. Unsophisticated vot-
ers can be impressed by budget manipulations which are made possible by forecast manipula-
tions; with overly optimistic growth and, thereby, exaggerated revenue forecasts the
government can expand its spending despite a constitutional balanced budget constraint.
Finally, the paper contributes to the policy discussion of European (supra-) national fiscal
rules.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The methods section discusses recent
developments in the literature and the motivation for including unsophisticated voters in an
electoral forecast cycle model. The model section comprises an outline of the model and its
general solution. The differences to previous political budget cycle models are pointed out; it is
shown that the winning probability can be affected by political manipulations. The results sec-
tion discusses the role of unsophisticated voters in explaining “context-conditional” political
cycles and the government’s countercyclical policy response to changing recession expecta-
tions as well as the theoretical and empirical implications of this new result.
Political cycles: Beyond rational expectations
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Methods
Politicians have long been suspected of manipulating electoral outcomes to their own advan-
tage by creating short-term economic boosts and/or by improving citizens’ economic condi-
tions just before an election. Yet, the evidence for such opportunistic politico-economic cycles
is mixed. First, monetary policy-induced cycles as originally suggested by Nordhaus [21] are
clearly rejected empirically [22]. Second, there is plenty of evidence on electoral manipulations
in fiscal policies. Political cycles can be found, for instance, in debt, public expenditures, espe-
cially transfers, and expenditure shares (for instance [23, 24]). Third, more recently, several
studies have argued that opportunistic political budget cycles (PBCs) are “context-condi-
tional”. The term was coined by Francese [25]. A literature survey is provided by de Haan and
Klomp [26]. For the context of Israeli local elections, Brender [27] finds the opposite effect;
refraining from short-termism may actually increase a politician’s re-election chances.
Responsible fiscal policies had a significant and positive effect in the 1998 local elections,
though not in two prior elections. Nonetheless, there is overwhelming evidence on “context-
conditional” political budget cycles. Many authors claim that political budget cycles are partic-
ularly relevant in developing countries ([28] [29] [30] [31] [32]). However, Brender and Dra-
zen [33] reexamine the sample used in [31] and find that the evidence points to new
democracies rather than developing countries. Others find that political budget cycles depend
on, for instance, low levels of fiscal or government transparency [34] [35]. Chang [36] and
Streb, Lema and Torrens [37] find that they are also affected by the political system; Alt and
Mooney [38] link them to the electoral system. Veiga, Veiga and Morozumi [39] confront sev-
eral of these conditioning factors and find that media freedom is key in reducing the incidence
of PBCs.
Suspicious unsophisticated voters
This paper presents a framework which extends the previous literature in two directions as
shown in Table 1 below. The first extension refers to the types of voters that are included in the
model; read the table from left to right. This paper introduces the concept of unsophisticated
voters into the theoretical political cycle literature. Unsophisticated voters are not (fully) ratio-
nal. Nonetheless, they might have a vague idea about what they should expect for the future.
They may be sensitive to the institutional “context” they encounter. If they perceive the func-
tioning of the government and the world around them as less transparent and more uncertain,
they may be more suspicious of government actions. The link between each institutional “con-
text” and the degree of uncertainty and suspicion created is likely to vary in each “context” and
is beyond the scope of this paper. What this paper can show is that any “context-specific” sus-
picions held by unsophisticated voters may prompt the government to respond optimally to its
expectation of such suspicions by employing its instrument(s) of manipulation. Unsophisti-
cated voters’ suspicions cannot be captured in a model where voters are assumed to form ratio-
nal expectations of future government behaviour or ability as, for instance, in Lohmann [40]
Table 1. Categories of political cycle models and types of voters.
Types of Voters:
Political . . . Cycles
Only Sophisticated Voters: Informed and Uninformed Sophisticated as well as Unsophisticated Voters:
Only Uninformed Voters: Informed and Uninformed Voters:
. . . Business . . . Lohmann, 1998
Rogoff and Sibert, 1988
. . . Budget . . . Rogoff, 1990 Shi and Svensson, 2006
. . . Forecast . . . This paper
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203390.t001
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and Shi and Svensson [31]. Instead, this paper argues that suspicions held by unsophisticated
voters (caused by institutional “context-specific” intransparency and uncertainty) are relevant
and can explain government manipulations. If we follow this line of reasoning, it is not sur-
prising that political cycles are more likely to occur, for instance, in new democracies and
developing countries (as well as other “contexts”), since intransparencies and uncertainties are
often very pronounced there.
Unsophisticated voters do not or cannot make good or full use of the available information;
they may misperceive information or ignore it for lack of interest; or they may misunderstand
the link between economic conditions and the available information (see also first part of
results section). As a consequence, they take decisions on the basis of a distorted perception of
reality. It should be noted that such deviations from rational expectations were already consid-
ered in the first (seminal) article on rational expectations by Muth [10]. Unsophisticated voters
may (or may not) be able to respond to the current government policy, but certainly not in a
(fully) rational way. In all other respect, they are not different from sophisticated voters. Like
any ordinary voter they are interested in voting for the candidate who they expect to deliver
the highest utility for them. In other words, all voters, sophisticated or not, are prospective. In
the literature, prospective voting has sometimes been associated indistinguishably (and con-
fusingly) with rational voting because voters were modelled, at the same time, to be able to
anticipate developments or changes in candidates’ behaviour or deviations from pre-
announced policy platforms after the elections. Here, rational expectations of sophisticated
voters refer to government manipulations that occur before elections; and there is nothing that
sophisticated voters could anticipate about the future (after elections) that unsophisticated vot-
ers would not know about either.
An unsophisticated voter is different to a voter in the adaptive-expectations framework sug-
gested by Nordhaus [21], where naive voters base their electoral choice on the past experience
with the behaviour of their government. An unsophisticated voter is also very different to the
uninformed voter suggested by Lohmann [40] and Shi and Svensson [31]—see Table 1. The
political business cycle model by Rogoff and Sibert [41] and the political budget cycle model
by Rogoff [42] can also be entered into the “only uninformed voters” column. To the best of
my knowledge, there is, however, no paper that could be added to the last column or to the
bottom row. – [41] and [42] are signalling models (unlike [40] and [31]) in which the govern-
ment can exploit an information advantage; the government has complete knowledge over its
own competence at the moment it takes decisions. As a consequence, we obtain the surprising
result (at least when contrasted with the real world) that governments which are incompetent
will not (be able to) signal, i.e. not be able to manipulate—a typical result in signalling models
though.
In this paper we include informed and uninformed voter suggested by Shi and Svensson
[31] (and Lohmann [40]). Their informed voters are rational in that they can deduce govern-
ment ability. However, their uninformed voters are also rational in that they are able to form
rational expectations about government behaviour. Both, informed and uninformed voters,
are actually very sophisticated. By including these sophisticated types in addition to unsophis-
ticated voters differences to these earlier papers can be clearly identified. With the inclusion of
unsophisticated voters it is now possible to explain the empirical finding (to my knowledge for
the first time in a theoretical model) that the incumbent’s vote share increases systematically
with electoral manipulations conducted by the government—as found by, for instance, Aidt,
Veiga and Veiga [43], Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya [35], and de Haan and Klomp [44]. Fur-
thermore, increased suspicions by unsophisticated voters amplify the political cycle; govern-
ment manipulations must be more potent than the suspicions held by unsophisticated voters
in order to be effective. If more political or economic intransparencies do really make voters
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more suspicious, then this result can explain the prominence of political manipulation in
countries suffering from intransparencies including developing countries and new
democracies.
Political forecast cycles
The second extension refers to the type of political manipulation (read aforementioned
Table 1 downwards). This paper introduces forecast manipulations as a government tool into
the theoretical political cycle literature. The model captures the specific circumstances of US
states, most of which have to adhere to constitutional balanced budget constraints. The result-
ing political forecast cycle model provides a theoretical explanation for empirical findings by
Boylan [45]. The specific forecast manipulations observed in US states are outlined below.
More generally, the results relate to European Union local and state governments as well as the
European discussion of (supra-) national fiscal rules—also discussed below.
The paper argues that a constitutional balanced budget constraint does not prevent deficit
making, albeit, possibly, avoid the build-up of long-term debt. In election years, the incumbent
claims to fulfill the balanced budget requirement ex ante, albeit based on overly optimistic
growth and, thereby, exaggerated revenue forecasts. Ex post, it turns out—to the government’s
mock surprise—that the budget cannot be balanced. But the government could expand spend-
ing despite the constitutional balanced budget constraint, thereby increasing its re-election
chances. The government machinations can only be effective because the incumbent can (par-
tially) hide the forecast manipulations from part of the electorate. Here is the hidden effort
which constitutes the moral hazard problem. As debt is costly, it will be repaid in off-election
years, thereby not only producing a political forecast cycle, but also a budget cycle. The model
here exhibits a mechanism similar to the one in other moral hazard political cycle models. In
Shi and Svensson [31] or Lohmann [40], for instance, politicians’ manipulations are aimed at
expanding the budget or the money supply, respectively, in order to increase re-election
chances. There, the incumbent can, however, not raise her re-election probability above 50%
due to the rational expectations assumption for uninformed voters—as already mentioned ear-
lier. Despite the forecast cycle perspective we can replicate their result by setting the share of
unsophisticated voters to zero; their papers are special cases of this paper.
The effect produced by suspicious unsophisticated voters on political cycles is studied
against the backdrop of constitutional balanced budget constraints and forecast manipula-
tions, but its implications are more general. The sovereign debt and banking crisis in the Euro-
zone revealed successful government attempts to manipulate the international public’s
perception of a country’s fiscal situation. Greece and other European countries cheated to hide
“excessive” public debt and/or deficits so that they could gain access to the European Monetary
Union and/or fulfill the criteria laid out by the European Stability and Growth Pact. On a
smaller scale, there is a history of budget forecasts which are distorted for political reasons,
especially prior to elections. There are at least two motives for such forecast manipulations: (i)
the government is overly optimistic (for instance, overestimates revenues) in order to have
more room for maneuver prior to an election; (ii) the government is overly pessimistic (i.e.
underestimates the budget balance) in order to show its competence by being able to do unex-
pected expansionary fiscal policies. The former view is supported, for instance, by Boylan [45]
with respect to optimistic revenue forecasts in US states from 1988 to 2004; by Heinemann
[46] with respect to optimistic deficit forecasts for Germany’s federal budget from 1969 to
2003; and, more recently, by Boukari and Veiga [47] with respect to optimistic budget forecasts
(both revenue and expenditures) in France and Portugal from 1998-2015. Bru¨ck and Stephan
[48] posit that the Stability and Growth Pact may actually have spurred forecast optimism in
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the eurozone. Jong-A-Pin, Sturm and de Haan [49] find evidence for both motives in an
OECD sample from 1997 to 2006. Overall, there is evidence for both views, possibly with more
support for the former.
Manipulations based on overly optimistic forecasts prior to upcoming elections create bud-
get and deficit cycles referred to as “electoral forecast cycle[s]” [48]. Boylan [45] argues that
such political manipulations lead to deficits prior to elections despite constitutional balanced
budget constraints being in place. Based on a panel data analysis for all 50 US states he pro-
vides evidence for pre-election revenue forecasts which are based on favourable estimates of
the macroeconomic environment and unrealistic growth assumptions. Table 2 summarises a
representative finding of his (while ignoring details, alternative regressions, and sensitivity
analyses). The table depicts only some key variables which also happen to be significant at the
5% level (marked by ). It shows that the state government’s forecast error for revenue growth
can largely be explained by macroeconomic variables (unemployment and income growth) as
well as the forecasting error for personal income. However, state revenue growth forecasts go
up, on average, by an additional 2.2% when the fiscal year starts (in most states on 1 July) in
the year of the elections (in November). Boylan’s [45] analysis also reveals significant coeffi-
cients for underreporting of pre-election state deficit figures, irrespective of the stringency of
their constitutional balanced budget constraint.
In the following model, the incumbent government faces a constitutional balanced budget
constraint as currently in place in all US states but Vermont, in Swiss cantons, progressively
also in German states as well as in many, if not most, local governments around the world. In
such a situation, a state (or local) government’s fiscal latitude can only be increased, if revenues
are expected to improve. In principle, any government has two options: raising tax rates and/
or predicting a higher tax base. The major drawback of the former is that tax rate increases
cannot be concealed and that they are not popular with most electorates in the US and else-
where, especially prior to elections. The advantage of the latter is that forecasts of higher tax
revenues do not receive so much attention, especially on the state level (and if they do, higher
tax revenues are not seen as a negative signal). The government can exert a hidden effort by
using the additional receipts for providing additional transfers which unsophisticated voters
perceive as improvement of their individual economic conditions. This is the scenario
Table 2. Forecast manipulation.
Dependent variable: State revenue growth forecast error
= Forecast state revenue growth
-State revenue growth
Fiscal year starts during election year 2.205
(.654)
State personal income forecast error 1.466
(.257)
Unemployment 3.433
(.515)
Income growth .631
(.105)
Observations 254
R2 .722
Notes: The table summarises Boylan (p. 420) [45], Table 3, column 4 (which is based on 45 states and the period
1997-2004). Only regressors that are significant at the 5% level () are listed. “The regressions include state-fixed
effects. Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors that account for clustering at the state-level are shown in
parenthesis”.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203390.t002
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discussed in this paper. (Ignoring tax rate increases could also be justified by making a formal
argument as in Shi and Svensson [31]. They obtain the optimal tax rate for the “equilibrium
without elections” and then use backward induction in the 2-period election cycle to argue
that the very same tax rate remains optimal. Moreover, territorial subdivisions may have lim-
ited or no influence on the determination of tax rates as in most municipalities, many prov-
inces or regions and, for instance, the German states).
In the model, the prediction of a higher tax base is captured by forecasting a higher growth
rate of the economy. Boylan (p. 414) [45] thinks there is a lot of scope for manipulation at the
state level: “the executive is likely to have the upper hand in determining the forecasts . . . in 44
states the governor directly appoints the budget director.” In the following, it is, therefore,
assumed that the government can not only influence, but even control the growth forecast
made by the budget office. In the model, the growth forecast by the state is measured as devia-
tion from national growth (normalised to zero for simplicity). So, such a state-specific growth
forecast (henceforth sometimes simply growth forecast) can be used as the government instru-
ment for expanding the state’s fiscal latitude and, ultimately, for affecting the incumbent’s re-
election chances. Specifically, the government will use its fiscal latitude for increasing state-spe-
cific transfers (henceforth, synonymously, also (additional) state transfers). The focus on trans-
fers is motivated by the empirical evidence (see methods section); but it also allows for a
relatively simple model structure.
An electoral forecast cycle model
Every alternate period an incumbent politician and a challenger representing two different
parties run for office. Politicians (henceforth also policymakers) are purely opportunistic and
want to convince the voters of being more competent than their opponent. The reason is that
voters (henceforth also individuals or agents) are prospective, i.e. they vote for the policymaker
who, they think, will be more competent after the elections. Voters’ utility hinges on economic
considerations, but also on a more or less strong personal predisposition or sympathy for one
of the candidates. This gives rise to an important trade-off; a voter with sympathies for one
party may vote for the other, if that party is expected to bring about better economic outcomes
for the voter after the elections.
Preferences, fiscal policy and competence
The utility function for any voter i reflects both economic and non-economic components:
Uit ¼
X1
s¼t
ðb
i
Þ
s  tEs½cs þ ay
izs: ð1Þ
The economic component cs (consumption) and the sympathy component θizs are additively-
separable with relative weight α in each period. Discounting between periods with discount
factor βi can ultimately be ignored (as will be seen later); it does not contribute to substance
nor exposition. To keep the model tractable, another simplification is that utility is linear in
consumption (which has been used before, when it does not affect the key mechanism [50];
alternatively, private and public goods consumption are assumed to be additively-separable
and a constant marginal utility of public goods is imposed [31].) Utility derived from sympathy
is constrained to y
izs 2   12 ;
1
2
 
since zt is either   12 (when party a is elected) orþ
1
2
(when
party b is elected); and the personal sympathy parameter θi is uniformly distributed over the
interval [−1, 1]. If individual i has somewhat more sympathies for party a, say at yi ¼   1
2
, then
her utility derived from sympathy is positive (1
4
), if party a is elected (zi ¼   12); but it is negative
Political cycles: Beyond rational expectations
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203390 October 11, 2018 8 / 23
(  1
4
), if party b is elected (zi ¼ 12). The sympathy component represents any attribute of the
candidates that does not affect economic policies, be it their stance on societal issues or their
good looks. (Without limiting the generality of the analysis we associate the incumbent with
party a and the challenger with party b).
Both politicians j = a, b face a utility function similar to the one for voters consisting, again,
of an economic and, if the politician is in power, a non-economic component. The non-eco-
nomic component is, however, different and includes both a political rent and a political (rep-
utation) cost:
Vjt ¼
X1
s¼t
Vjs ¼
X1
s¼t
ðb
j
Þ
s  t Es ½cs þ IsXs   Is  1IsxsD2s  1; j ¼ a; b;
Ir ¼
(
1 if in power in period r;
0 otherwise:
ð2Þ
Both policymakers are concerned with consumption. In addition, politician a (in power)
receives ego rent Xs and bears reputation costs (xsD2s  1), if she was also in power in the previous
period. The reputation costs rise overproportionally (squared) with the previous period viola-
tion (Ds−1 > 0) of the constitutional balanced budget constraint (requiring Ds−1 0). The qua-
dratic form is the simplest way of capturing how the government’s trustworthiness and
credibility are affected. The legislature and social groups the government has to deal with may
“tolerate” small, but not large, deviations and dislike both surpluses and deficits. Again, dis-
counting does not matter for the results.
Voters’ and politicians’ period t consumption ct alike is constrained by nation-wide (per
person) income yt; each agent’s additional net-of-tax income (1 − τ)tyt due to state-specific
growth rate shock t; and period-specific additional state transfers Tsþt :
ct ¼ yt þ ð1   tÞtyt þ T
sþ
t : ð3Þ
Tax rate τ is taken to be constant and (per person) national income yt may vary over time, but
they are both exogenous. All voters observe the fluctuations of national average income yt, but
not the state-specific deviation. State-specific growth rate shock t is a random variable with
mean Et[t] = 0 and variance σ2. Tsþt may be interpreted as transfers facilitated by the state gov-
ernment on top of what is normally provided. (Arguing along these lines, Eq 3 could also be
obtained by assuming that the normal level of transfers matches the taxes on nation-wide (per
person) income yt as follows: ct ¼ ð1   tÞð1þ tÞyt þ Tallt ; with T
all
t ¼ T
normal
t þ T
sþ
t and
Tnormalt ¼ tyt . Note that deadweight loss and distributional effects are ignored).
Additional state-specific transfers Tsþt depend upon fiscal latitude Lt minus the repayment
for last period’s deficit (1 − r)(Dt−1), modulo the government’s positive or negative competence
shock, Z
j
t .
Tsþt ¼ Lt   ð1þ rt  1ÞDt  1 þ Z
j
t; ð4Þ
Lt ¼ t
a
t yt: ð5Þ
Fiscal latitude is determined by the state government’s forecast at of state-specific growth rate
shock t. The variable 
a
t is incumbent a’s instrument and forms the basis for her budget calcu-
lations. National interest rate rt−1, known by everybody, determines the repayment costs for
any level Dt−1. If we think of states without large debt due to the constitutional balanced budget
constraint, the rate at which the state government can borrow money should not carry a state-
Political cycles: Beyond rational expectations
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203390 October 11, 2018 9 / 23
specific risk premium. Hence the interest rate is assumed to be exogenous, though not neces-
sarily constant across periods.
Competence could be interpreted, for instance, as tax collection efficiency or transfer allo-
cation efficiency. Government j’s competence Zjt consists of a skills shock for the current
period and another one for the previous period:
Zjt ¼ m
j
t þ m
j
t  1: ð6Þ
Hence competence persistence is modelled as an MA(1) process. Limited persistence is a com-
promise. It allows some persistence while acknowledging that competence also changes over
time as new tasks for politicians emerge. For persistence longer than 1 period, the model
would not be easily solvable. Rogoff and Sibert’s [41] and Rogoff’s [42] suggestion of an MA(1)
process is one of two conditions (the other being the aforementioned assumption of debt
being costly) for splitting the model into separate 2-period cycles as is common in this litera-
ture. Each cycle consists of an election period and an off-election period. The timing of events
(page 11) and the role of these assumptions is outlined further down.
Each skills shock m
j
t is a random variable with mean 0, distribution function Fðm
j
tÞ ¼ FðÞ
and density function f ðmjtÞ ¼ f ðÞ ¼ F0ðÞ which is (weakly) monotonously increasing up to
the mean. (For more unusual density functions (for instance, with F@ðmat Þ < 0 for some
mat  0), we could get ambiguous results; however, the limiting case of F
@ðmat Þ ¼ 0 for some
mat  0 or even over the entire range (uniform distribution) is acceptable.) Past shocks are
common knowledge, but current or future shocks are unknown to both policymakers and pri-
vate agents. Even the incumbent does not know her own current competence—an idea sug-
gested by Shi and Svensson [31] – because she always faces new tasks and challenges (like the
financial or migration crises) or wants to start new programmes and cannot foresee how effi-
ciently she can manage them. Not knowing her own competence, any incumbent has an incen-
tive to provide additional state transfers in order to appear more competent and increase her
re-election chances. Since policymakers do not have an informational advantage, there is no
signalling, only moral hazard.
Additional state-specific transfers are actually deficit-financed intertemporal transfers, not
income redistribution. State deficits are constitutionally prohibited, but can (and typically will)
appear because the incumbent has an incentive to increase her fiscal latitude by raising her
state-specific growth forecast above the state-specific growth rate shock (honestly) expected by
herself. If the realised state-specific growth rate shock turns out to be much greater than
expected, there may be a surplus instead of a deficit. This can be seen from the government
budget constraint which is obtained residually; the realised deficit (not expected deficit) is
defined as realised government expenditures minus realised government revenues. In our
model, this corresponds to realised state-specific transfers Tsþt according to Eqs 4 and 5, but
excluding the competence shock (which, if positive, only increases transfers costlessly), minus
realised tax revenues (τt yt):
Dt  tat yt   ð1þ rt  1ÞðDt  1Þ   ttyt
¼ tðat   tÞyt   ð1þ rt  1ÞðDt  1Þ:
ð7Þ
The deficit expected by government a in election period t is:
Eat ½Dt ¼ tð
a
t   E
a
t ½tÞyt   ð1þ rt  1ÞðDt  1Þ: ð8Þ
With her state-specific growth forecast at incumbent a hopes to facilitate additional state trans-
fers (Eqs 4 and 5), thereby accepting (and expecting) a positive deficit. This is so, when the
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government has average growth expectations for the state, i.e. Eat ½t ¼ Et½t ¼ 0. However,
later on we relax this assumption. Proposition 4 considers a perturbation of Eat ½t. – Note that
state-specific growth rate shocks appear in three different forms, their forecasts also in three
forms. Growth rate shock t is a random variable with expectational value Et[t]; (honest) expec-
tations by the incumbent Eat ½tmay differ. Growth forecast 
a
t refers to the manipulated forecast
used by the government to justify its fiscal policy choices. Unsophisticated voters’ perception
of the state government’s forecast is denoted by Eunsopht ½at  ¼ ^at
unsoph
; the government’s expecta-
tion thereof is Eat ½^at
unsoph
. See also Eqs 15 to 18 further down.
Timing of events
The timing of events is summarised in Table 3. In election period t, everybody observes last
period’s deficit Dt−1 and past skills shock mat  1. On this basis, incumbent a chooses state-specific
growth forecast at , thus determining her fiscal latitude Lt and providing additional state trans-
fers Tsþt for the public according to Eqs 5 and 4, respectively. All voting individuals observe
Tsþt , but only informed sophisticated voters can also observe and make use of the state govern-
ment’s policy choice of state-specific growth forecast at . They can, therefore, deduce current
skills mat , thereby extracting information about the future competence of the incumbent (since
Zatþ1 ¼ m
a
tþ1 þ m
a
t ). Uninformed sophisticated voters form rational expectations about the
incumbent’s choice of forecast manipulation at , hence also about m
a
t . The description of unin-
formed sophisticated and unsophisticated voters in Table 3 is similar, but they are conceptually
very different. Unsophisticated voters also form expectations about mat , but their expectations
are based on their perception of the government growth forecast, ^at
unsoph
, which hinges on sus-
picions that can not or, at best, only partially be influenced by the government and its choice
of at , i.e. they are not (fully) rationally expected. Finally, all voters cast their votes based on
their different information sets and their different beliefs of mat . What matters is that a share of
voters is uninformed (and sophisticated) and a share is unsophisticated. If government policy
could be properly judged by all voters, the government would gain nothing from manipulating
the forecast and from expanding state-specific transfers.
Table 3. The timing of events.
All voters and
incumbent a observe:
• last period’s deficit
Dt−1
• the incumbent’s last
period skills mat  1
Incumbent a:
• chooses state-
specific growth
forecast at
• and provides
additional state-
specific transfers
Tsþt
All voters observe:
• additional state-
specific transfers Tsþt
Informed
sophisticated voters
observe:
• the incumbent’s
state-specific growth
forecast at
Informed sophisticated voters:
• deduce the incumbent’s current skills
mat
• and vote.
Uninformed sophisticated voters:
• form expectations of the incumbent’s
current period skills m^at
uninf
(based on
rational expectations of the
incumbent’s state-specific growth
forecast ^at
uninf
)
• and vote.
Unsophisticated voters:
• form expectations of the incumbent’s
current period skills m^at
unsoph
(based on
their suspicions of the incumbent’s
state-specific growth forecast ^at
unsoph
)
• and vote.
The winner of the
period t elections
takes office and
receives an ego rent.
If the incumbent
stays in office, she
suffers a reputation
loss, if the balanced
budget constraint
was violated in
period t.
The winner repays
the deficit of the
previous year.
Period t Period t+1
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203390.t003
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In period (t + 1), the winner (incumbent or challenger) takes office and receives an ego rent.
If the incumbent stays in office, she also suffers a reputation loss amounting to disutility xtD2t  1
for having violated the balanced budget constraint. (A government found to have cheated may
be in a weaker position in negotiations with the legislature and social groups.) However, voters
are no longer relevant for the policymaker’s decision making in (t + 1) because they cannot vote
in period (t + 1). State politicians have no incentive for manipulating their growth estimate at .
They want to repay the previous period deficit because the deficit is costly (interest and reputa-
tion loss) and voters cannot sanction the policymaker for reducing state-specific transfers. That
means effectively levying additional taxes to finance the deficit repayment. Given that voters are
only concerned with politicians’ competence after the election it does not matter that individuals
anticipate in election period t that any politician will repay the deficit in the off-election period
(t + 1). Note also that voters do not consider expected utility in (t + 2) in their voting decision in
t, because even informed sophisticated voters cannot distinguish between the incumbent and
her challenger in (t + 2) (competence is an MA(1) process only). Politicians, too, are not con-
cerned with the more distant future, because they have no instrument for affecting their own
utility or re-election chances in (t + 2). The model can, therefore, be split in 2-period cycles con-
sisting of an election period (period t) and an off-election period (period t + 1).
The general solution
The incumbent maximises her expected utility in t and t + 1 (whereby the discount rate is set
to 0 for simplicity). The latter depends on the probability of the incumbent of winning the elec-
tion. First, we must, therefore, determine the probability that an individual agent votes for
incumbent a. It depends on whether a voter expects the incumbent or the challenger to deliver
a higher level of utility after the elections, i.e. in t + 1. This depends on two components: (i) on
the individual’s sympathy θi towards the candidates; and (ii) on who can deliver more state-
specific transfers which, in turn, depends on the politicians’ skills shock in periods t and t + 1.
Agents do not know future skills of incumbent or challenger; nor can they observe any skills
of the challenger in period t. However, they may have expectations on the incumbent’s skills
(Et½mat ), for instance based on her performance in office in period t. It is shown in the
S1 Appendix that an individual agent votes for incumbent a, if the following inequality (which
corresponds to Eq A.6 in Appendix A in the S1 Appendix) holds:
Et½m
a
t  > ay
i
: ð9Þ
Even if incumbent a is expected to be (slightly) less skilled than average, i.e. Et½mat  < 0, an indi-
vidual will still vote for incumbent a, if the voter is sufficiently sympathetic towards the incum-
bent (remember that θi< 0 indicates sympathy for incumbent a and α is a positive weight).
Conversely, even if a voter is sympathetic towards the challenger (θi> 0), the incumbent could
still be chosen, if the incumbent is expected to exhibit sufficiently strong (above average)
competence.
Second and on this basis, we can derive the probability for the incumbent to win the elec-
tion (same as Eq B.1 in Appendix B in the S1 Appendix):
Prob ð1   g   cÞ
Einft ½mat 
2a
þ
1
2
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
informed sophisticated
þ g
Euninft ½mat 
2a
þ
1
2
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
uninf : sophisticated
þ c
Eunsopht ½mat 
2a
þ
1
2
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
unsophisticated

1
2
8
>
><
>
>:
9
>
>=
>
>;
ð10Þ
The probability depends on whether informed sophisticated voters (share (1 − γ − ψ)), unin-
formed sophisticated voters (share γ) and unsophisticated voters (share ψ) think that the
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incumbent’s skills are above average (Et½mat  > 0) or not. The difference for informed sophisti-
cated and the other voters occurs because informed sophisticated voters have all the skills and
information for deducing mat from the period t transfer Eqs (4) and (5); the other voters do not.
Uninformed sophisticated and unsophisticated voters do not observe state-specific growth
forecast at ; instead, they have to use their perception of the incumbent’s state-specific growth
forecast ^at
uninf
and ^at
unsoph
, respectively. Hence, their mistake amounts to tð^at
uninf
  at Þyt and
tð^at
unsoph
  at Þyt , respectively—as shown in Appendix B in the S1 Appendix. On this basis, we
can derive the incumbent’s probability of winning Probwin (identical to Eqs B.6 and B.7):
Probwin ¼ Prob mat  gtð^at
uninf
  at Þyt þ ctð^at
unsoph
  at Þyt
n o
ð11Þ
¼ 1   F½gtð^at
uninf
  at Þyt þ ctð^at
unsoph
  at Þyt; ð12Þ
where F(•) is the distribution function of the skills shock. Eq 11 shows that a sufficient increase
in at (forecast manipulation) leads to a perceived expansion of fiscal latitude (^
a
t
uninf
< at and/
or ^at
unsoph
< at ). The incumbent who is ex ante uncertain about her competence will try to
push the right hand side in the bracket of Eq 11 below zero in order to increase the chance of
appearing competent, i.e. increase the probability of winning the election above 1/2. Note that
the aforementioned equations also show that the incumbent can increase her winning proba-
bility even in equilibrium. Uninformed sophisticated voters are assumed to rationally expect
the government manipulations (^at
uninf
¼ at ), but not so unsophisticated voters. The expansion
of the winning probability would only be impossible, if unsophisticated voters, too, could
somehow—for some strange reason—fully anticipate the government machinations.
Under the unrealistic assumption of rational expectations for all voters we would obtain
Probwin ¼ 1   F½0 ¼ 1
2
in equilibrium.
Third, we can turn to the incumbent’s decision problem. The incumbent maximises
expected utility over any 2-period cycle, i.e. period t utility plus period (t + 1) utility in case of
winning the election multiplied by the probability of winning (as determined in Eqs 11 and
12) plus period (t + 1) utility in case of losing multiplied by the probability of losing:
maxat V ¼ maxat V
a
t þ V
a
tþ1 ¼
maxat E
a
t fyt þ ð1   tÞtyt þ T
sþ
t þ X   xD
2
t  1g
þ Eat fProb
win
½ytþ1 þ ð1   tÞtþ1ytþ1 þ Tsþtþ1 þ X   xD
2
t g
þ Eat fð1   Prob
win
Þ½ytþ1 þ ð1   tÞtþ1ytþ1 þ Tsþtþ1g:
ð13Þ
The S1 Appendix offers a more explicit version (Eq C.1) and a simplified version (Eq C.2) of
maximisation problem 13.
Having verified the second order conditions we can characterise the government’s optimal
choice of its state-specific growth forecast at
 with the first order condition (FOC). Again, an
extended version is presented in Eq C.3 in the S1 Appendix; a condensed version here:
  rttyt þ ½F
0ðÞðgþ cÞtyt ½X   xðE
a
t DtÞ
2
   ½1   FðÞ ½2xtytðE
a
t DtÞ ¼ 0: ð14Þ
The first term, (−rtτy), is the marginal direct net effect of the government’s state-specific
growth forecast on deficit, which is negative, because deficit including repayment is costly.
The growth forecast is optimally chosen by the government, when the negative marginal direct
net effect on deficit (first term) equals the net effect on the expected return if the incumbent
stays in power (second and third terms). The latter consists of countervailing effects. The
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second term depicts the positive marginal impact of higher forecasts on the perceived compe-
tence of the incumbent and thus on the voting probability of receiving the (given) expected net
return (X   xðEat DtÞ
2
). The third term captures the negative marginal impact of increased
forecasts on the punishment for the lost reputation (since deficit will be increasing) given the
chance of winning the elections.
Forth, we can now ask several questions. Our first set of question: why is the government’s
optimal choice of at
 overly optimistic and what is the effect thereof? The mechanism is similar
to the one in Shi and Svensson’s [31] political budget cycle model. There is moral hazard
because a hidden effort (deficit in Shi and Svensson; and forecasts here) is used by the govern-
ment for expanding fiscal latitude and trying to improve re-election chances (without success
there, but successfully here; see Proposition 1 in the next section). Our second set of questions:
how is the government’s optimal choice of its forecast manipulation affected by exogenous
aspects of the model? Some of the (straightforward) perturbation results (reported in Appen-
dix E in the S1 Appendix) are also similar to Shi and Svensson [31]; higher social costs of
incurring a deficit reduce the manipulation; higher benefits of being in office increase the
manipulation. Other results (Propositions 2 and 3; first part of next section) differ because
unsophisticated voters do not vote rationally here—in contrast to the uninformed voters of the
Lohmann [40] and Shi and Svensson [31] type. Then, Proposition 4 (second part of next sec-
tion) evaluates the effect of government recession expectations.
Results and discussion
The state budget office’s forecast of state-specific growth, at , is publicly available. Informed
sophisticated voters use the information rationally to infer the current competence of the pol-
icymaker. Uninformed sophisticated voters do not observe the information, but rationally
expect the incumbent’s optimal forecast choice at the equilibrium (see Eq 15 below) and hence
the policymaker’s competence. This is the standard rational expectations assumption, but
applied to a setting with both informed and uninformed voters present (similar to Shi and
Svensson [31]). In equilibrium, uninformed sophisticated voters rationally anticipate the cor-
rect growth forecast that informed sophisticated voters could observe in the first place. That is
why there are conceptual objections. Grossman [51], for instance, argues that informed and
uninformed agents must hold different beliefs in equilibrium. His assertion was made in the
context of a financial market model. According to Grossman, informed and uninformed
agents can only hold identical beliefs in equilibrium, if there is an observable economic vari-
able, which contains the entire information the uninformed agent could otherwise not have
observed. In his model, a price may (or may not) fulfil this role, but here (or in Shi and Svens-
son’s [31] model) there is no such variable which would allow the uninformed voters to extract
the relevant information. – The rational expectations assumption for uninformed sophisti-
cated voters explains why re-election chances cannot be improved without the existence of
unsophisticated voters; this applies to [31] and it applies here, when the share of unsopisticated
voters ψ is set to zero.
The role of suspicious unsophisticated voters
Unsophisticated voters base their beliefs on their suspicions of government policy. Up to now,
we have not discussed in how far their beliefs depend on actual government policy. From the
discussion of Eqs 11 and 12 we know, however, that any deviation from rational expectations
affects the winning probability which, in turn, raises the government’s desire to manipulate its
forecast. Qualitatively, it does not matter, how much the suspicions by unsophisticated voters
deviate from rational expectations as long as a part of those suspicions is exogenous to the
Political cycles: Beyond rational expectations
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203390 October 11, 2018 14 / 23
government manipulation. How and why unsophisticated voters deviate from rational behav-
iour is not specified and also not needed; possible reasons are given on page 4. In some sense,
unsophisticated voters are similar to “quasi-rational agents” as discussed by Russell and Thaler
[5] [6]; unsophisticated voters are still maximising, i.e. trying to vote for the candidate who
they think will deliver the highest level of utility for them; however, they use a wrong mapping,
in particular they are unable to form rational expectations (unlike uninformed sophisticated
voters). In contrast to “quasi-rational agents” à la Russell and Thaler, they may, however, also
have to base their decisions on a wrong information set.
The simplest way of capturing the idea of unsophisticated voters is by assuming that they
base their beliefs entirely on exogenous suspicions β which surpass expected (unbiased) growth
Et[t] (see Eq 16 below). (Note that this is not a deviation from the rational expectations out-
come of the manipulated government growth forecast at
, but from the underlying growth
expectations Et[t] = 0). – When the incumbent optimises with respect to her forecast manipu-
lation, she must take the beliefs of non-rational voters into account. The incumbent’s expecta-
tion of the unsophisticated voters’ beliefs may be imprecise (parameter κ in Eq 17). – We must
also consider that the incumbent has (honest) expectations of the growth prospects of the
economy which may differ from expected (unbiased) growth Et[t] by parameter λ (see Eq 18).
Here are formal expressions for all these expectations:
Euninft ½
a
t  ¼ ^
a
t
uninf
¼ at
; ð15Þ
Eunsopht ½
a
t  ¼ ^
a
t
unsoph
¼ Et½t þ b ¼ b; ð16Þ
Eat ½^at
unsoph
 ¼ Eunsopht ½
a
t  þ k ¼ bþ k; ð17Þ
Eat ½t ¼ Et½t þ l ¼ l: ð18Þ
We can now make use of the rational expectations assumption for uninformed sophisti-
cated voters (Eq 15) and the specifications for expectations of unsophisticated voters and the
government (Eqs 16 to 18). The explicit version of the FOC incorporating these modifications
(given in Eq C.8 in the S1 Appendix) is the basis for the perturbation results presented in Prop-
ositions 2, 3 and 4. However, we can also insert Eqs 15 and 16 into Eq 12 in order to determine
the equilibrium probability of getting re-elected. This leads to.
Proposition 1- Re-election Chances.
Manipulations by the incumbent are effective in that they increase the incumbent’s vote share
(as long as the optimal growth forecast manipulation by the government, at
, exceeds unsophisti-
cated voters’ suspicions β).
Proof: Simple inspection of Eq 12; see also discussion thereof on page 13.
Numerical Example: The unbiased expected growth rate (Et[t]) is 0%, but unsophisticated
voters are suspicious and think the government might benefit from better economic condi-
tions (e.g. β = 1%). Suppose also that the incumbent knows this (κ = 0%). Then, any (optimal)
growth forecast by the government above 1% (at > 1%) would allow the government to
increase transfers beyond what unsophisticated voters expect and, thereby, expand its winning
probability according to Eq 12 (since uninformed sophisticated voters rationally anticipate the
optimal forecast so that the first term in the F function of 12 drops out).
How much political support increases depends on the magnitude of the wedge between sus-
picions by unsophisticated voters and the actual degree of the manipulation. The proposition
corroborates evidence by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya [35], Aidt, Veiga and Veiga [43], and
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de Haan and Klomp [44] who find that politico-economic machinations positively influence
re-election chances. Boylan [45] and Aidt, Veiga and Veiga [43] even find evidence for a “close
election bias”, i.e. that government manipulations increase, if the election is closely contested.
Note that Eq 12 also indicates that the political support could fall below 50%, if b > at
.
Irrespective of the magnitude of β, an increase in suspicions always leads to an upward
adjustment of the optimal degree of forecast manipulation—as stated in.
Proposition 2- Suspicions by Unsophisticated Voters and Government Expectations.
If the government expects unsophisticated voters to grow more suspicious (at the equilibrium),
even if this is unfounded, then it is optimal for the government to increase its growth forecast,
though underproportionally.
0 <
dat
db
¼
dat
dk
< 1:
Proof: Appendix D in the S1 Appendix.
Numerical Example: Take the example from the previous proposition: expected growth rate
Et[t] = 0%, but unsophisticated voters who were not very suspicious originally now become
more sceptical towards (average) economic conditions (e.g. β changes from 1% to 2%). Again,
suppose the incumbent knows this (κ = 0%). Now, any (optimal) growth forecast by the gov-
ernment above 2% (at > 2%) would allow the government to expand its winning probability
according to Eq 12 (given that uninformed sophisticated voters rationally anticipate the opti-
mal forecast). If the incumbent wanted to preserve its winning probability, it would have to
raise the growth forecast one-for-one in order to surpass expected transfers by as much as
before. However, that would mean incurring a higher deficit which is costly. Hence, the
incumbent will increase the forecast somewhat less, thereby trading off debt repayment (and
reputation) costs with winning probability. –Any misjudgement by the government (κ) has
the same effect as suspicions of unsophisticated voters (β) since the government optimises
based on what it thinks unsophisticated voters belief.
If the state government anticipates or merely believes an exogenous increase in the unso-
phisticated voters’ perception of the state government’s growth forecast, the government will
respond by increasing the deliberate forecast manipulation even further. This is the “> 0”
component. Suppose unsophisticated voters perceive a worsening of fiscal or political trans-
parency. How much of it does the government anticipate? If the incumbent realises that unso-
phisticated voters become more sceptical towards the government or merely imagines it, then
she will respond by increasing her manipulation. This may explain why politico-economic
manipulations are especially common in developing countries and new democracies. The
“< 1” indicates, however, that the wedge between government manipulation and suspicion
becomes smaller and smaller when unsophisticated voters become more and more suspicious.
It becomes more and more costly for the government (in terms of deficit financed transfers) to
“outperform” suspicious unsophisticated voters.
The proposition even covers the situation that unsophisticated voters are overdoing their
scepticism by expecting a growth forecast manipulation beyond a level of manipulation that is
optimal for the government. Even then it would, again, be optimal for the government to
extend its manipulation, if suspicions anticipated by the government were increased. Whatever
the situation, an increase in the unsophisticated voters’ suspicions of the state government’s
growth forecast manipulation (if anticipated by the government) also implies a reduction of
electoral support (implication from Proposition 1). (If the government falsely expects an
increase in suspicions, the expected electoral support goes down and the forecast manipulation
goes up, but actual electoral support will increase, not decrease.) The two propositions together
Political cycles: Beyond rational expectations
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203390 October 11, 2018 16 / 23
explain the government’s rationale for expanding the manipulation. The government reopti-
mises by accepting more costly deficit in order to prevent a sharp reduction of the probability
of re-election.
The next proposition brings out the difference between uninformed sophisticated and
unsophisticated voters (and, consequently, another major difference between this paper on the
one hand and Lohmann [40] and Shi and Svensson [31] on the other hand).
Proposition 3- The Shares of Different Types of Voters.
An increase in the share of uninformed sophisticated voters (at the equilibrium) leads to an
expansion of the government’s optimal choice of growth forecast manipulation.
An increase in the share of unsophisticated voters leads to ambiguous results.
ið Þ
dat

dg
> 0; iið Þ
dat

dc
≷ 0:
Proof: Appendix D in the S1 Appendix.
Result (i) seems to be the intuitive result; that more people can be manipulated leads to
more manipulation by the government. In a different setting, such an effect is also found by
Shi and Svensson [31] (and could also be shown for [40] given the rational expectations logic).
Note that this applies to uninformed sophisticated voters who rationally expect the government
manipulation in equilibrium. (The winning probability cannot be increased with manipula-
tions; Proposition 1 does not apply.) Result (ii) says that the same does not necessarily hold for
a larger share of unsophisticated voters. That the cycle increases with more unsophisticated vot-
ers is likely to hold though, if unsophisticated voters are very suspicious of the government (as
can be expected in countries with a high degree of uncertainty and intransparency as, for
instance, in developing countries or new democracies). Then manipulating is costly (large ex
post deficit; deficit costs increase overproportionally with higher deficits) because the forecast
manipulation has to be large in order to have at least some effect on the winning probability.
Nonetheless, impressing highly suspicious voters is so costly that the wedge between manipu-
lation and suspicions is kept to a minimum. Increasing the share of unsophisticated voters
means that more voters can be affected. The manipulation becomes more effective and will be
extended despite the high costs for increasing the deficit even further. If unsophisticated voters
are, however, not very suspicious, the wedge between government manipulation and suspi-
cions can be larger because manipulation is not very costly. Individual unsophisticated voters
are very likely to vote for the incumbent. Hence the government may (depending on the prop-
erties of F(•) and the parameter constellations) even be able to get re-elected when it reduces
its manipulation knowing that it can now affect a larger share of all voters very effectively.
Recession expectations by the government
It is almost commonplace now that “Recession and Re-election Don’t Mix” [52]. The title was
chosen by The New York Times at the occasion of recession fears prior to the then upcoming
re-election campaign of George Bush (sen.) and potential problems for Bush’s advisors to find
“ways to boost the economy for their political advantage in an election year”. If all voters fully
adjusted their expectations to an upcoming recession, economic downturns would not have a
negative effect for re-elections as suggested by The New York Times. In reality, it is unlikely
that all voters adjust their expectations of government policy as soon as state-specific recession
tendencies are discussed in the media. In particular, unsophisticated voters should remain
unsophisticated, if recession expectations change [17].
In this paper, it is assumed that no unsophisticated voter is sophisticated enough to adjust
his/her expectations. The same qualitative result is, however, obtained, if we assume that only
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a share of unsophisticated voters responds to recession expectations and/or unsophisticated
voters respond only partially. (Note that the behaviour of sophisticated voters is not affected by
changes in recession expectations because they are either informed and can infer the govern-
ment’s skills from observing the government’s growth forecast or they are uninformed and
can rationally expect the government’s state-specific growth forecast.) The question is then
how an opportunistic government can manipulate policies in the face of its own recession
fears knowing that part of the electorate will attribute a bad economy to bad government poli-
cies. Boylan [45] suggests that “government officials can avoid choosing between raising taxes
and cutting government programs by making optimistic forecasts when the economy is
headed for a downturn.” The next proposition shows how the typically optimistic forecasts
(based on an—on average—steady economy as discussed before) will be adjusted to cushion
the effects of an expected recession.
Proposition 4- Recession (or Boom) Expectations.
Imminent recession expectations by the government (lower Eat ½t in Eq 13) decrease the gov-
ernment’s optimal growth forecast at the equilibrium, but underproportionally. (Analogously,
boom expectations increase optimal growth forecasts, but, again, underproportionally).
0 <
dat
dl
< 1:
Proof: Appendix D in the S1 Appendix.
Numerical Example: Again, take the example from Proposition 1: expected growth rate
Et[t] = 0%; unsophisticated voters are suspicious (β = 1%). In addition, the government
changes her (honest) growth expectations to, for instance, λ = −1. Consequently, it also thinks
(maybe falsely) that it needs a growth forecast of above 2% (at > 2%) to surpass transfer expec-
tations by voters. Compared to no (honest) recession expectations the government would want
to (optimally) increase the forecast and hence the deficit, but, once again, not one-for-one
because it is, again, trading off debt repayment (and reputation) costs with winning probability.
If we perturb the equilibrium so that the policymaker expects a downturn (reduced (honest)
expectations by the government of state-specific growth, Eat ½t < Et½t ¼ 0), she reduces her
state-specific growth forecast at , but not as much as E
a
t ½t goes down. Hence the state govern-
ment’s growth forecast will be even more optimistic relative to the government’s realistic (hon-
est) growth expectations. This means that the government also expects to run an even higher
deficit. An anticipated recession leads to an amplified budget cycle. This amounts to a counter-
cyclical policy effect, but for the wrong reasons, namely that an opportunistic incumbent tries
to manipulate forecasts and fiscal policies in order to ensure her own re-election. In an empiri-
cal study on sub-Saharan African countries, Diallo [53] finds that democratic institutions
make fiscal policies countercyclical. He had suspected, but could not find empirically, that
political business cycles (caused by political competition) produce procyclical policies. (Procy-
clical policies in developing countries are, however, found in other papers, for instance [19].)
This paper argues that political forecast cycles may contribute to a countercyclical policy effect
in election years.
But why will the government adjust as suggested in Proposition 4? Suppose the government
did not adjust its state-specific growth forecast at , but state growth was indeed lower. Then the
deficit would increase, but that would be costly. So it would have been optimal for the govern-
ment to reduce its growth forecast at . However, a reduction of 
a
t means accepting lower elec-
toral support from unsophisticated voters (since ^at
unsoph
does not change in Eqs 11 and 12).
Thus, the government wants to re-optimise by trading off deficit costs for loss of re-election
probability; and it chooses to reduce its growth forecast at only underproportionally in order
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to preserve a sufficiently positive effect on its re-election chances. (If the expected recessionary
shock is too large, not even that may be possible. This would be the case, if the government’s
optimal choice turned out to be a negative state-specific growth forecast. This would also
imply a negative provision of transfers (Tsþt < 0Þ).
Corollary 1- The Effect on Debt.
If the imminent recession expectations by the government (lower Eat ½t) are justified, the actual
deficit increases (at the equilibrium) [decreases with boom expectations].
dD
dl
< 0:
Given that the government responds underproportionally to an expected downturn or
upturn (Proposition 4), the corollary follows directly from Eqs 8 and 7. Essentially, the corol-
lary says that political opportunism encourages the government to run more countercyclical
policies, at least during election years. Note, however, that the deficit would be reduced (aug-
mented), if the recession (boom) expectations did not materialise.
In the real world, the countercyclicality result could be stronger. In this model, a deficit is
also costly because of the reputation costs the government suffers from in the post-election
period according to Eq 2. However, voters will probably not punish the government so much
for having missed the balanced budget requirement ex post, if it turns out that it happened
during a recession. As deficits might be less costly in the real world compared to the model
world, this would reinforce the incumbent’s willingness to use overly optimistic forecasts for
facilitating an expansionary policy during a recession.
It is good news that opportunistic government behaviour may also have a stabilising effect
in case of a boom or a recession. It is particularly good news for many developing countries
that used to suffer and mostly still suffer from procyclical fiscal policies [19]. At least during a
recession occurring in an election year, the economic contraction would be somewhat allevi-
ated according to Proposition 4. This result goes beyond the mere existence of political forecast
and budget cycles (for the standard case of no recession expectations) as confirmed by empiri-
cal evidence ([45] and others) and the theoretical result of this paper. In addition, it says that
expected recessions increase such a political forecast and budget cycle. This is a new theoretical
finding, which can, in principle, be tested empirically.
To my knowledge, the effect of expected recessions on political cycles has been ignored in
the literature thus far. Boylan [45] tries to capture the effect of actual recessions on forecasts in
US states by including changes in actual unemployment, income and inflation, but cannot
test, if recessionary a priori expectations affect the magnitude of forecast manipulations. Kam-
let, Mowery and Su [54] find that actual recessions affect long-run, but not short-run forecasts.
Furthermore, their results are based on federal US data (where only a soft fiscal limit applies)
and not on data for US states (where constitutional balanced budget constraints are in place).
It may not be straightforward to extract data for true expectations by state governments on
their economic outlook, because the data published by the states is exactly what we suspect,
namely, intentionally, too optimistic. It is not straightforward to overcome this problem. In
the US context, we might be able to use the national economic outlook (which is known to be
less biased) and break it down to the state level. This would, however, require the use of spe-
cific state level economic indicators as well as some understanding of the state level dynamics
of US business cycles (see, for instance, [55]). On this basis, it might be possible to construct a
panel data set with US state governments’ (honest) recession expectations.
As for other countries, one might be able to use the national forecasts as proxies for (honest)
regional or state-level government expectations, if sub-national units are not too
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heterogeneous. On a national level, for instance for developing countries, one could use Inter-
national Financial Statistics/World Economic Outlook forecasts for the election year published
by the International Monetary Fund in the year before. This is the recession/boom informa-
tion available to the government when it has to form its own (honest) expectations prior to
taking decisions on politico-economic manipulations.
Conclusion
The paper argues that much of the empirical evidence on political cycles falls into place, if we
introduce suspicious unsophisticated voters into the theoretical political cycle literature. In
particular, it can be shown (to my knowledge for the first time in a theoretical model) that the
government actually succeeds in systematically boosting its re-election chances. This is con-
firmed by empirical studies [44] [43] [35] which argue that the incumbent’s vote share
increases with electoral manipulations conducted by the government.
The paper posits that part of the electorate has suspicions towards the government which
are “context-specific” and increase with uncertainties and any type of intransparency present
in a country’s economic and political system. Uncertainties and intransparencies could be
present in a country’s fiscal constitution, the functioning of the political debate, the running of
the political process in parliament, the power structure within the government, the electoral
system, the distrust of politicians in some new democracies, or the high levels of corruption in
some developing countries. Unsophisticated voters are prospective, i.e. interested in future
outcomes which depend on the government’s abilities or competence; but they are not able to
(fully) rationally expect the government’s machinations (a partial response to actual current or
expected future government behaviour may be possible though). In this paper, it can be shown
that an increase in suspicions by part of the electorate increases the government’s willingness
to manipulate. The reason is that the government will try to “outperform” suspicious unso-
phisticated voters. It will try to appear more competent than expected by those voters in order
to increase its chance of being re-elected. These results and the aforementioned considerations
suggest the following logic which is straightforward, but has been ignored thus far: politically
motivated manipulations increase with the degree of suspicions held by unsophisticated voters;
suspicions originate in uncertainties and intransparencies and are particularly relevant in the
aforementioned “contexts”, in particular in developing countries and new democracies; it is
not surprising, therefore, that, in empirical research, political cycles are especially found in
specific “contexts”.
The model presented in this paper also makes a new prediction which could be tested
empirically. It is in the nature of an opportunistic policymaker that she will adjust her manipu-
lations to her own expectations of the conditions in the economy given the suspicions of unso-
phisticated voters. If an incumbent expects an imminent downturn, she may reduce her
otherwise envisaged forecast (to avoid excessive deficit costs), but not by as much as her expec-
tations have gone down because she tries to avoid or limit increases in taxes or cuts in spend-
ing programmes just before the election. Hence she may be keen on producing particularly
optimistic forecasts (relative to her own honest expectations) in order not to appear incompe-
tent and loose too many votes. If there are boom expectations, forecast optimism may be
dampened. Overall, political opportunism thus produces, unintentionally, a countercyclical
policy effect. Despite having clear empirical implications this finding has not been discussed in
the literature thus far (apart from the hunch by Boylan [45] mentioned in the main text).
The paper also offers a theoretical explanation for political distortions found in forecasts by
US states [45], where most budget directors are directly appointed by the governor. Based on
overly optimistic revenue forecasts the incumbent state government can conduct expansionary
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fiscal policies in order to appear more competent prior to an upcoming election. Since the
resulting deficit can only be observed afterwards, the government can effectively circumvent a
constitutional balanced budget constraint. As a result, there are political forecast and budget
cycles in the state. More generally, however, these findings may also apply to European coun-
tries where (constitutional) balanced budget constraints are or will be in place. Constitutional
debt brakes in Switzerland (from 2003) and Germany (from 2016 nationally, from 2020 on the
state (La¨nder) level), for instance, focus on the deficit; those in Poland, Spain, Italy and Austria,
for instance, on the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio; the European Fiscal Compact as of 2013 refers to
both deficit and debt. The results may also relate to politically motivated manipulations by
governments vis-à-vis their European partners as, for instance, when Greece obtained mem-
bership of the Euro area on the basis of fudged budget figures.
It is somewhat disturbing that budget manipulations can be successful despite national (or
state level) constitutional balanced budget constraints and international rules and oversight.
This paper pinpoints a possible underlying mechanism: the government tries to “outperform”
suspicious unsophisticated voters. (Obviously, the same mechanism could also apply in other
settings, not least the corporate world.) It is hard to think of remedies. How could political
decision making be improved given this strong underlying mechanism? As for policy analysis,
it is important to take government manipulations as a prevalent feature into account. The good
news is that political opportunism produces countercyclical fiscal policies in election years.
Further theoretical research may be devoted to adjusting the model to a situation in which
the government does not have direct control over fiscal forecasts—as in the European context.
As for empirical research, one could try to verify or reject the theoretical prediction that fiscal
policy turns more countercyclical in election years due to political opportunism. In the context
of developing countries, it would be interesting to see which role the presumed countercycli-
cality effect plays in alleviating their typical procyclicality problem. Understanding the key
mechanisms against the backdrop of US states may have been a first step.
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